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We propose a theoretical model to analyze the welfare implications
of price discrimination in the presence of differences in quality. The
model considers two markets where in each market competition takes
place between a local firm that operates in that market only and a
global firm that operates in both markets. All firms are assumed to be
producing with zero marginal costs. Local firms produce a good that is
perceived by consumers to have superior quality than that produced
by the global firm. We find that there are parameter values such
that welfare increases while total output decreases if the global firm
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1 Introduction
In many industries, competition takes place between firms that operate in
a particular geographic market and firms that are active in many different
geographic markets. For instance, the retailing industry is characterized by
competition between local firms and chain stores, the latter being active in
a large number of different markets. Other industries where this pattern ap-
pears are hotels, restaurants, hairdressers, or auto repair shops. Frequently,
local stores charge a higher price and actually manage to survive suggests
that consumers value their products more. This higher valuation is consis-
tent with their products being of higher quality, not necessarily in terms of
product characteristics, but for instance because of more proximate location
of local stores, or the provision of additional services.
A question naturally arises about the welfare implications of the pricing
policies adopted by the firm active in several markets, especially price dis-
crimination. This pricing policy is widely used. For instance, Cooper (2003)
reports empirical evidence from the UK supermarket industry that pricing
policies vary across supermarket chains, with seven supermarket groups pric-
ing according to local conditions, a strategy known as price flexing. These
pricing policies are sensitive to income and the presence of discount retailers.
The UK Competition Commission is concerned about some of the chains
engaging in price flexing for reasons not just attributable to local operating
costs. The Commission considered that this practice was anticompetitive,
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although no action was taken. We analyze the welfare implications of price
discrimination in the presence of differences in quality among competitors.
For instance, Matsa (2011) defines a supermarket’s product as the shopping
experience it provides its customers. He argues that product availability con-
stitutes an important aspect of product quality in the supermarket industry.
Using data collected by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, he finds that su-
permarkets that face more intense competition have less frequent stockouts.
Price discrimination has typically been regarded as welfare-reducing un-
less it leads to an increase in output. In this paper, we show that in the
presence of quality differences among firms, this may not be the case. In our
model, we consider two markets and three firms. In each market, there is one
local firm, which operates exclusively in that market. Additionally, there is
a third firm that operates in both markets, which we refer to as the global
firm. The global firm sells a product whose quality is lower than those of local
firms. We compare the cases of the global firm choosing a uniform price and
being allowed to price discriminate across markets. We find that it may be
the case that, even though price discrimination leads to an aggregate output
decrease, it may give rise to a welfare increase in the two markets combined.
This is because price discrimination brings about a positive allocation effect
that more than offsets the negative output effect. We believe that this result
should be taken into account by the competition authority when evaluating
the potential welfare implications of third-degree price discrimination.
Our goal, therefore is to study whether price discrimination carried out
3
by firms that operate across different markets, for instance retail chains, is
beneficial for society. A na¨ıve approach would be that third-degree price
discrimination is welfare increasing as long as output increases, whether the
market total output or merely that of the retail chains. However, if quality
differences are present, we show that this is not necessarily the case. In
particular, and using linear demand functions, total output may decrease
while welfare increases with price discrimination.
The study of the relationship between the output and misallocation effects
constitutes the traditional approach to the analysis of the welfare implica-
tions of price discrimination. According to this approach, if total output does
not vary, there is a misallocation effect that brings about a welfare loss. Of
course, if output increases, other effects on welfare are present. Among the
classical contributions to the study of this issue we find Robinson (1933), or
Schmalensee (1981), that conclude that an output expansion is a necessary
condition for welfare to increase with price discrimination, assuming firms
operating with constant marginal costs. Varian (1985) generalizes this re-
sult to interdependent markets and increasing marginal costs, and Schwartz
(1990) proves this result for decreasing marginal costs. Aguirre et al. (2010)
discuss conditions under which welfare increases or decreases with price dis-
crimination when all markets are served, and considering general demand
functions, see also Cowan (2007) for an analysis assuming non-linear de-
mands. In an oligopoly setting, Stole (2007) argues that the basic result goes
through in imperfect competition, provided that the firms are equally effi-
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cient at production and the number of firms is fixed. In this line, Dastidar
(2006) extends the basic analysis to a symmetric cost duopoly to provide
conditions under which total output decreases with price discrimination, and
welfare may either increase or decrease with price discrimination.
In addition to the well-known output and misallocation effects, an addi-
tional effect of price discrimination, namely a cost effect, may be considered.
That is, the total cost of producing the same output level may be differ-
ent under price discrimination than with a uniform price, and this cost effect
may be positive or negative. For instance, Galera and Zaratiegui (2006) show
that in a Cournot duopoly where firms have different costs, the cost effect my
more than offset the output and misallocation effects, so that the total effect
of price discrimination is positive, even though total output decreases. On
the other hand, Galera et al. (2014) prove that the cost effect may also arise
in a monopoly with increasing marginal costs and in the presence of demand
uncertainty. This cost effect may make total welfare to increase, although
output decreases with price discrimination.
There are a number of contributions that depart from the assumption of
product homogeneity, introducing either horizontal or vertical product differ-
entiation. For instance, Jorge and Pires (2013) take into account the role of
price discrimination on industry structure with two geographically different
markets and potential entry by a producer of a horizontally differentiated
product. The effect on welfare depends on the degree of product substi-
tutability and entry costs. The product quality dimension has recently been
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considered in the analysis of price discrimination, with quality typically being
endogenously chosen by competing firms. In a vertical differentiation setting,
Ikeda and Toshimitsu (2010) show that if a monopolist facing linear demands
and simultaneously choosing product quality and price, price discrimination
brings about a quality effect that always dominates the misallocation effect
–output effects are absent in this model. Quality is introduced in the analysis
as a proportional increase in willingness to pay. The monopolist’s incentives
to invest in quality increase with price discrimination, which increases welfare
via an increase in consumer surplus. A similar result is obtained in Alexan-
drov and Deb (2012), namely that the increase in the investment in quality
when price discrimination is allowed relative to a uniform price may domi-
nate the misallocation effect. This model introduces different preferences for
quality in the markets among which there is price discrimination, and the
result is extended to the case of a Bertrand duopoly. Nguyen (2014) uses
instead a model with variable quality costs to find that monopolistic third-
degree price discrimination is always welfare-reducing, regardless of whether
quality levels are endogenous or exogenously given, a result that contrasts
with that in Ikeda and Toshimitsu (2010).
Price discrimination in input markets, as opposed to final goods markets,
has also received a considerable attention from researchers. Indeed, accord-
ing to O’Brien (2014), the Robinson-Patman Act arose from concerns that
large downstream firms were harming smaller rivals by negotiating larger
discounts with suppliers. Yoshida (2000), assuming that downstream pro-
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ducers differ in their efficiency levels, finds that an increase in total output
of the final good is a sufficient condition for welfare to decrease with price
discrimination. Adachi and Matsushima (2014) consider an oligopoly of dif-
ferentiated producers to derive a necessary and sufficient condition for price
discrimination to increase welfare, namely the degree of substitution being
sufficiently greater in the strong market than in the weak market.
At an empirical level, Shepard (1991) analyzes data on the gasoline retail-
ing market in Massachusetts and finds evidence consistent with firms engag-
ing in price discrimination in an oligopolistic environment where service qual-
ity varies. Analyzing the Swedish newspaper industry, Asplund et al. (2008)
find that newspapers use price discrimination as a way to attract subscribers
from rival newspapers. Focusing on the supermarket industry, Basker (2011)
finds empirical evidence of Wal-Mart selling inferior goods, since its revenues
increase during downturns, and Dobson and Waterson (2005) analyze a chain-
store’s decision on whether to use uniform prices or prices that are adapted
to the characteristics of local markets to find that price discrimination is not
always optimal from the perspective of the chain store.
Our paper differs from the previous contributions to the literature in
a number of aspects. Specifically, in our model, the global firm offers an
exogenously-given quality level that is different than those offered by local
firms. We find that the misallocation effect might go in the opposite way as
it typically does, absent quality effects and cost effects. In particular, the
fact that there are two qualities in each market may make the misallocation
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effect positive, so that price discrimination may have a positive effect on
welfare, even though total output remains constant. In our model, firms do
not choose quality levels, and all costs are set to zero. This way, the quality
and cost effects do not play any role in the basic result of our model. The
basic result is obtained only if the quality of the global firm’s product is
lower than that of the local firms. If the global firm offers a higher-quality
product than the local firms, the sign of the misallocation effect is negative,
as expected by the standard theory.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 will describe
the theoretical model that is used in the analysis. Section 3 discusses the
conditions that must hold for price discrimination to be the global firm’s
optimal strategy, increase welfare, and decrease total output. Finally, section
4 presents some concluding comments.
2 The model
2.1 Basic setup
Assume that there are two geographically different markets, with a contin-
uum of consumers in each market. As in Shaked and Sutton (1982) or Shaked
and Sutton (1983), consumers in each market differ in their willingness to pay
for quality. In particular, the willingness to pay for the low and high quality
goods by a consumer in market i characterized by θ is given by ai − θ and
si(ai− θ), respectively, with si > 1 being the quality level of the high-quality
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good in market i. Furthermore, we assume that consumers’ willingness to
pay for quality follows a uniform distribution in the [0, ai] support. Under
this assumption, markets differ in their total sizes. Without loss of generality,
let us assume that s2 ≥ s1, that is, the quality increase of the high-quality
product is valued more in market 2 than in market 1.
In each of the two markets, there is a local firm, which operates in that
market only, and a global firm, which operates in both markets. The local
firm in market i offers a product with quality si > 1. Hence, local firms offer
products that are of superior quality relative to that of the global firm. As it
is usually assumed in this type of models, every consumer consumes at most
one unit of one of the two goods offered in each market, whether the high-
or the low-quality good. Firms engage in a price-setting game, whose stages
are as follows:
1. The global firm decides whether to introduce a uniform price or to price
discriminate.
2. Firms simultaneously choose prices, and quantities an profits are real-
ized.
As it is usually done in this type of games, we will analyze the final stage
first and proceed backwards. This task is undertaken in the next subsection.
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2.2 Market outcome
In the final stage of the game, firms simultaneously choose prices for their
products. Let pki,j denote the price posted by firm j in market i under pricing
regime k, where j ∈ {L,G}, with L denoting the local firm and G denoting
the global firm. Additionally, k ∈ {U,D}, where U denotes a uniform price,
whereas D denotes price discrimination. Given prices, we find that the con-
sumer in market i that is indifferent between purchasing from the local and
from the global firm, given pricing regime k, has willingness to pay xi such
that
si(ai − xi)− pkiL = ai − xi − pkiG ⇔ xi = ai −
pkiL − pkiG
si − 1 . (1)
Since the difference between the surpluses from buying from the local
firm and buying from the global firm, (si − 1)(ai − xi) − pkiL + pkiG, grows
when xi decreases, all consumers characterized by θ ∈ [0, xi] will purchase
from the local firm, whereas the remaining consumers will opt for the global
firm. This way, and since consumers’ willingness to pay for quality follows a
uniform distribution, the demand for the local and the global firm will be
xiL = ai − p
k
iL − pkiG
si − 1 , xiG = ai − xi − p
k
iG. (2)
In the following two subsections we present the computation of the equi-
librium outcome, that is prices, quantities, and profits for the two alternative
pricing policies that the global firm may adopt, namely price discrimination
or a uniform price.
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2.2.1 Price discrimination
With price discrimination, the global firm will choose market-specific prices,
pD1G and p
D
1G, whereas the local firms will choose prices p
D
1L and p
D
2L, respec-
tively. This way, the expression for profits as a function of prices is given
by
ΠD1L = p
D
1L
(
a1 − p
D
1L − pD1G
s1 − 1
)
; ΠD2L = p
D
2L
(
a2 − p
D
2L − pD2G
s2 − 1
)
; (3a)
ΠDG = p
D
1G
(
pD1L − pD1G
s1 − 1 − p
D
1G
)
+ pD2G
(
pD2L − pD2G
s2 − 1 − p
D
2G
)
. (3b)
Given that firms simultaneously choose the prices of their products, the
equilibrium prices are given by
pD1L =
2a1s1(s1 − 1)
4s1 − 1 , p
D
2L =
2a2s2(s2 − 1)
4s2 − 1 (4a)
pD1G =
a1(s1 − 1)
4s1 − 1 , p
D
2G =
a2(s2 − 1)
4s2 − 1 . (4b)
Once the equilibrium prices have been obtained, output levels in equilib-
rium are
qD1L =
2a1s1
4s1 − 1 , q
D
2L =
2a2s2
4s2 − 1 , q
D
1G =
a1s1
4s1 − 1 , q
D
2G =
a2s2
4s2 − 1 . (5)
11
2.2.2 Uniform price
In this case, the global firm is constrained to posting a uniform price, pUG,
whereas local firms choose prices pUiL. Then, profits may be written, as a
function of these prices, as
ΠU1L = p
U
1L
(
a1 − p
U
1L − pUG
s1 − 1
)
; ΠU2L = p
U
2L
(
a2 − p
U
2L − pUG
s2 − 1
)
; (6a)
ΠUG = p
U
G
(
pU1L − pUG
s1 − 1 − p
U
G
)
+ pUG
(
pU2L − pUG
s2 − 1 − p
U
G
)
. (6b)
Therefore, solving the first-order conditions of these three maximization
problems,
∂ΠU1L
∂pU1L
= 0,
∂ΠU2L
∂pU2L
= 0 and
∂ΠUG
∂pUG
= 0, the equilibrium prices chosen by
the global and the local firms are:
pU1L =
(s1 − 1)a1
2
+
(a1 + a2)(s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) , (7a)
pU2L =
(s2 − 1)a2
2
+
(a1 + a2)(s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) , (7b)
pUG =
(a1 + a2)(s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)
8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2 . (7c)
These three equations, together with equation (2) allow us to compute
the equilibrium quantities. These are:
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qU1L =
a1
2
+
(a2 + a1)(s2 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) , (8a)
qU2L =
a2
2
+
(a2 + a1)(s1 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) , (8b)
qU1G =
a1
2
− (a2 + a1)(2s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) , (8c)
qU2G =
a2
2
− (a2 + a1)(s1 − 1)(2s2 − 1)
2(8s1s2 − 5(s1 + s2) + 2) . (8d)
Notice that 8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2 is positive for s1, s2 > 1. to see this,
simply substitute s1 = 1 + x and s2 = 1 + y, with x, y > 0. The global firm
will produce in both markets under a uniform price as long as qU1G, q
U
2G > 0,
which translates into:
(2s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)
6s1s2 − 4s2 − 3s1 + 1 <
a1
a2
<
6s1s2 − 3s2 − 4s1 + 1
(s1 − 1)(2s2 − 1) .
Also notice that the total local quantity is proportional to total quantity
produced by the global firm, in whatever regime, K = U, D, because
(
qK1L + q
K
2L
)
= 2
(
qK1G + q
K
2G
)
.
This way, the sign of the total output change is the same as that of the
change in the global firm’s output.
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3 Welfare analysis
In this section, we present the main results of the paper. Given the equilib-
rium outcomes that we computed int he previous section, we are interested
in verifying whether there are parameter values such that the following three
results hold: i) total output decreases with price discrimination; ii) total
welfare increases with price discrimination; and iii) the global firm’s profits
increase with price discrimination. If this is the case, then, the global firm
finds it profitable to engage in price discrimination, total output decreases,
and yet welfare decreases. We will analyze each of these conditions in turn.
3.1 Total output
If the global firm is allowed to price discriminate, it will raise its price in one of
the two markets and lower it in the other market, relative to uniform pricing.
Following Robinson (1933) and Holmes (1989), we refer to the strong market
as that in which the global firm raises its price with price discrimination, and
to the weak market that in which the firm lowers its price. The following
proposition considers how the quantities moves with a price regime change.
Proposition 1 If the quality level offered by local firms is the same in both
markets, that is if s2 = s1, then both the total output and the quantity pro-
duced by the global firm remains unchanged with the change in price regime.
If the quality level of the local firm is higher in the strong market, then the
global firm reduces its total production under price discrimination. The op-
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posite occurs when the valuation is higher in the weak market.
Proof. Remember that we have introduced the assumption s2 ≥ s1.
Now, let us fix the parameters s1, s2 and a2 in any value, and let a1 be a
variable. Let us define the critical value
a∗1 =
a2(s2 − 1)(4s1 − 1)
(s1 − 1)(4s2 − 1) . (9)
This is the cutoff value that determines which one is the strong market.
Specifically, from equations (24b) and (27b), when a1 = a
∗
1, then p
D
1G = p
D
2G =
pUG. In consequence, all the quantities are the same in both price regimes.
When a1 > a
∗
1, then the strong market is Market 1, because p
D
1G > p
D
2G.
Now we calculate the derivative of the change in total quantity produced
by the global firm with respect to a1. Let us call
∆QG = q
D
1G + q
D
2G − (qU1G + qU2G). (10)
Notice that ∆QG is a linear function of a1. Then
∂∆QG
∂a1
=
s1
4s1 − 1 −
2s1s2 − s1 − s2
8s1s2 − 5s1 − 5s2 + 2 =
=
(s1 − 1)(s2 − s1)
(4s1 − 1)(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2) ≥ 0
(11)
Let us see first the case s2 = s1. By equation (11), ∆QG does not change
when a1 changes. But, from equation (24b), we know that when a1 = a
∗
1, all
the quantities under the different regimes are the same. So, if s2 = s1, then
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∆QG = 0 for any value of the parameters. Therefore, the first part of the
proposition is proved.
Let us now assume that s2 > s1. In this case, by equation (11), ∆QG
increases when a1 increases. We know that for a1 = a
∗
1, ∆QG = 0. Then, for
a1 > a
∗
1, total quantity increases when switching from uniform price to price
discrimination.
This proposition implies that when s2 > s1 the global firm’s output will
decrease with price discrimination for values a1 < a
∗
1. Hence, it is left for us
to study what is the behavior of total welfare and the global firm’s profits
when a1 < a
∗
1. We intend to verify whether there are values of a1 < a
∗
1 such
that the global firm’s profits increase and yet total welfare increases.
3.2 Welfare
We now proceed to characterize the total welfare function, defined as the sum
of consumer surplus and firm’s profits. We will compare the two relevant
cases, namely when the global firm is constrained to posting a uniform price
and when it is allowed to price discriminate across markets.
Specifically, given equations (5) and (8), we can compute welfare for K =
{U, D}
16
WK =s1a1q
K
1L − s1
(
qK1L
)2
2
+ s2a2q
K
2L − s2
(
qK2L
)2
2
+
+qK1G
(
a1 − qK1L −
qK1G
2
)
+ qK2G
(
a2 − qK2L −
qK2G
2
)
.
(12)
We now define the function
∆W = WD −WU (13)
The following proposition states under what circumstances total welfare
increases with price discrimination.
Proposition 2 The following claims are true:
(1) The function ∆W may be expressed as a21A + a
2
2B − 2a1a2C, where
A, B and C are functions of s1 and s2. Furthermore, A(s1, s2) = B(s2, s1)
holds.
(2) If s1, s2 > 1, then A > 0.
(3) The second-degree polynomial ∆W (a1) has two positive roots. One
of them is r1 = a
∗
1. The other root, call it r2 = w
∗, satisfies (under the
assumption s2 > s1) w
∗ < a∗1.
Proof. Claim (1) can be easily seen because all the expressions for quantities
are linear functions of a1 and a2, and welfare is obtained as a sum of products
of at most two quantities. This is robust to changes in the market subindices,
hence the function ∆W is symmetric with respect to a change in the subindex.
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Regarding claim (2), in order to computeA, let us compute first ∆W (a1, a2)
for a2 = 0. That is, let us assume that a2 = 0 in equations (5) and (8). Of
course, we are aware of the fact that when a2 = 0 output is zero in market 2.
We are merely interested in determining the sign of the A coefficient. Using
equation (12), we obtain
WD(a1, 0) = a
2
1
s1(12s
2
1 − s1 − 2)
2(4s1 − 1)2 .
And under the assumption of a uniform price, we have,
WU(a1, 0) = a
2
1
(
3s1 + 1
8
+
(s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)(8s1s2 − 3s2 − 3s1 − 2)
8(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2)2
)
.
After some algebra, one can see that the difference can be written as
A = ∆W (a1, 0) = a
2
1
(s1 − 1)2R(s1, s2)
8(4s1 − 1)2(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2)2 . (14)
where
R(s1, s2) = 128s1
2s22−16s1s22−144s21s2 +52s21−28s22−11s1 +21s2−2. (15)
It is easy to see that R > 0, since when replacing s1 = 1 + x and s2 = 1 + y,
the expression R simplifies to
R(x, y) = 128x2y2 + 112x2y + 240xy2 + 36x2 + 84y2 + 192xy + 45x+ 45y,
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which is positive as long as x, y > 0 or, equivalently s1, s2 > 1. This proves
claim (2).
Regarding claim (3) we know that the polynomial in a1, ∆W (a1), has a
root in r1 = a
∗
1. This is because we defined a
∗
1 in equation (9), in such a way
that pD1G = p
D
2G = p
U
G. This implies that for a1 = a
∗
1, the rest of the prices and
quantities are the same in the uniform price and in the price discrimination
regimes. Hence, it is clear that ∆W (a∗1) = 0.
Since this polynomial has a real root, it must have another real root, call
it w∗. Using this, we know that
∆W (a1) = A(a1 − a∗1)(a1 − w∗) = Aa21 − a1A(a∗1 + w∗) + a∗1w∗A.
We verified in claim (1) that ∆W (a1) = a
2
1A + a
2
2B − 2a1a2C, therefore,
a∗1w
∗A = a22B. But from claim (2), we know that B(s1, s2) = A(s2, s1).
Therefore, the other root of the polynomial is
w∗ =
a22
a∗1
A(s2, s1)
A(s1, s2)
. (16)
Therefore, w∗ > 0. We still have to prove that w∗ < a∗1, or, equivalently,
a22
A(s2, s1)
A(s1, s2)
< (a∗1)
2 .
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From equation (14), we have that
A(s2, s1)
A(s1, s2)
=
(s2−1)2R(s2,s1)
8(4s2−1)2(8s1s2−5s2−5s1+2)2
(s1−1)2R(s1,s2)
8(4s1−1)2(8s1s2−5s2−5s1+2)2
=
(s2 − 1)2(4s1 − 1)2R(s2, s1)
(s1 − 1)2(4s2 − 1)2R(s1, s2) .
Recall the definition of a∗1 in equation (9). From this, it may be seen that
in order for us to prove this point, we need to show that
1 < s1 < s2 ⇒ R(s2, s1) < R(s1, s2).
But applying equation (15)
R(s1, s2)−R(s2, s1) = 16(s2 − s1)(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2) > 0.
This completes the proof.
What proposition (2) shows is that total welfare is a quadratic function
of a1, with a positive coefficient on a1. Moreover, since at a
∗
1 the outcome
is identical in both regimes, it must be the case that ∆W = 0 at a∗1. Then
the other point at which ∆W intersects the horizontal axis is to the left of
a∗1. Hence, welfare increases with price discrimination to the left of this other
root and to the right of a∗1.
3.3 The global firm’s profits
We now turn to the analysis of the global firm’s profits so as to determine
whether the global firm engages in price discrimination, and compare the
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restrictions on the parameters with those from the analysis of total output
and welfare. If the global firm was a monopoly, it is easy to see that the
level of pi if maximizing over H will never exceed the level of pi if the choice
variables are from J ⊃ H. Therefore, since a uniform price is a subset of
two prices, in principle profits with differentiated prices should exceed those
with a uniform price.
However, we are now in an oligopoly setting, and the global firm’s profits
do not depend on its own prices only, but also on the reaction to those prices
by the rest of the firms. This –as it is well known–, may make profits be
larger if there is a commitment to uniform pricing. In our setting, prices
are strategic complements. Relative to uniform pricing, price discrimination
softens competition in the weak market, and increases it in the strong market.
If s1 = s2, there are parameter values such that the global firm’s profits may
actually decrease with price discrimination.
In order to compute the global firm’s profits, we will make use of equa-
tions (24b), (5), (27b) and (8). Therefore, since marginal costs are zero, we
can express the global firm’s profits in both regimes, price discrimination and
uniform prices as
ΠDG = p
D
1Gq
D
1G + p
D
2Gq
D
2G; Π
U
G = p
U
G
(
qU1G + q
U
2G
)
. (17)
With these profit levels at hand, let us define the function that describes
the change in the global firm’s profits when moving from uniform pricing to
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price discrimination as
∆Π = ΠDG − ΠUG (18)
Once the ∆Π function has been defined, we may now formulate the fol-
lowing proposition, which is analogous with the previous one, which dealt
with total welfare.
Proposition 3 The following claims are true:
(1) The function ∆Π can be expressed as a21M + a
2
2N − 2a1a2H, where
M , N and H are functions of s1 and s2. Furthermore, it is the case that
M(s1, s2) = N(s2, s1).
(2) If s1, s2 > 1, then M > 0.
(3) The second-degree polynomial ∆M(a1) has two positive roots. One of
them is r1 = a
∗
1. The other root, call it r2 = pi
∗, is such that (assuming that
s1 < s2) w
∗ < pi∗ < a∗1, where w
∗ was computed in proposition 2.
Proof. Claim (1) may be proved identically as proposition 2.
Regarding claim (2), in order to obtain the expression for M , we will
compute ∆Π(a1, a2) for a2 = 0. Therefore, we will assume that a2 = 0 in
equations (24b), (5), (27b) and (8). Using equation 17, we obtain
ΠD(a1, 0) = a
2
1
s1(s1 − 1)
(4s1 − 1)2
.
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Under the assumption of uniform prices, we obtain
ΠU(a1, 0) = a
2
1
(s1 − 1)(s2 − 1)(2s1s2 − s1 − s2)
(8s1s2 − 5s1 − 5s2 + 2)2
.
After some algebra, it may be seen that the difference is
M = ∆Π(a1, 0) = a
2
1
(s1 − 1)2T (s1, s2)
(4s1 − 1)2(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2)2 . (19)
where
T (s1, s2) = 32s
2
1s
2
2 − 32s21s2 − 16s1s22 + 9s21 − s22 + 10s1s2 − 3s1 + s2. (20)
It may be readily verified that T > 0, since when substituting s1 = 1+x and
s2 = 1 + y, the expression for T boils down to
T (x, y) = 32x2y2 + 32x2y + 48xy2 + 9x2 + 15y2 + 42xy + 9x+ 9y,
which is positive as long as x, y > 0, or, equivalently s1, s2 > 1. This
completes the proof of claim (2).
Finally, regarding claim (3) we know that the polynomial in a1, ∆Π(a1),
has one root in r1 = a
∗
1. This is the case because we have defined a
∗
1 in
equation (9), so that pD1G = p
D
2G = p
U
G. This implies that for a1 = a
∗
1, all
remaining prices and quantities are the same in both regimes. Therefore, it
is clearly the case that ∆Π(a∗1) = 0.
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Since this polynomial has one real root, it must have another root, call it
pi∗. This allows us to conclude that
∆Π(a1) = M(a1 − a∗1)(a1 − pi∗) = Ma21 − a1M(a∗1 + pi∗) +Ma∗1pi∗.
We have seen in the proof of claim (1) that ∆Π(a1) = a
2
1M + a
2
2N − 2a1a2H,
hence, Ma∗1pi
∗ = a22N . But from the proof of claim (2), we know that
N(s1, s2) = M(s2, s1). Therefore, the other root of the polynomial is
pi∗ =
a22
a∗1
M(s2, s1)
M(s1, s2)
.
And therefore, pi∗ > 0. We are still left with proving that w∗ < pi∗ < a∗1.
Recalling te definition of w∗, from equation (16), we have to prove that
a22
a∗1
A(s2, s1)
A(s1, s2)
<
a22
a∗1
M(s2, s1)
M(s1, s2)
< a∗1.
The proof for pi∗ < a∗1 is analogous to that in proposition 2. From equa-
tion (19), we have that
M(s2, s1)
M(s1, s2)
=
(s2−1)2T (s2,s1)
(4s2−1)2(8s1s2−5s2−5s1+2)2
(s1−1)2T (s1,s2)
(4s1−1)2(8s1s2−5s2−5s1+2)2
=
(s2 − 1)2(4s1 − 1)2T (s2, s1)
(s1 − 1)2(4s2 − 1)2T (s1, s2) .
Recall the definition of a∗1 in equation (9). From this that we conclude
that in order to prove this claim, we need to show that
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1 < s1 < s2 ⇒ T (s2, s1) < T (s1, s2).
However, applying equation (15)
T (s1, s2)− T (s2, s1) = 2(s2 − s1)(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2) > 0.
In order to see that w∗ < pi∗, we simply have to check that
R(s2, s1)
R(s1, s2)
<
T (s2, s1)
T (s1, s2)
.
Since
R(s1, s2)T (s2, s1)−R(s2, s1)T (s1, s2) =
= 2(4s1 − 1)(s2 − s1)(4s2 − 1)(8s1s2 − 5s2 − 5s1 + 2)2,
This completes the proof.
3.4 Price discrimination and welfare
The previous three subsections analyzed conditions such that total output
decreases, welfare increases, and the global firm’s profits increase with price
discrimination. We now combine these results and summarize them in the
following corollaries. Furthermore, we illustrate the intuition by means of
some numerical examples.
Corollary 4 If s2 = s1, then total output is the same under price discrimi-
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nation as under a uniform price. Total welfare and the profits of the global
firm are greater under price discrimination, except in the case a1 = a2, when
they are equal.
If s1 = s2, total quantity does not change when the global firm engages in
price discrimination, although welfare increases. Moreover, the quality level
of the products produced by the two local firms are the same, both being
greater than the quality of the product produced by the global firm. Notice
that if s1 = s2, then the critical value a
∗
1 = a2, and thus market 2 will be
the strong market as long as a2 > a1. Without loss of generality, assume
that this is the case. Then, relative to uniform pricing, the global firm raises
its price in the strong market (market 2) and lowers it in the weak market
(market 1).
As a consequence of the global firm’s engaging in price discrimination, to-
tal output increases in the weak market, and decreases in the strong market,
but the addition across markets remains constant. Furthermore, by exam-
ining equations (5) and (8) we immediately verify that the local firm in the
strong market raises its output if the global firm price discriminates, whereas
the local firm lowers its output under price discrimination. Not only that,
but the absolute value of the change in sales by the two local firms is the
same. Hence, since the global firm’s output remains constant and the local
firm’s output in the strong market increases by the same amount as the de-
crease in the local firm output in the weak market, welfare increases with
price discrimination, even though total output remains constant. If a1 = a2
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then the two markets are identical, and price discrimination has no effect on
welfare.
In order to illustrate these ideas, let us consider some numerical examples.
In all cases, let us fix a2 = 1 and consider different realizations of the rest of
the parameters. For instance, if s1 = s2 = 1.1, if a1 =
1
2
, then market 1 is the
weak market (and market 2 is the strong market). In fact, when the global
firm is allowed to price discriminate, it optimally chooses pD1G = 0.0147 and
pD2G = 0.0294 in contrast with a uniform price p
U
G = 0.022. The effect of price
discrimination is that the local firm’s output increases in the strong market
and decreases in the weak market, with total output remaining constant
relative to the case of uniform pricing. Specifically, in the strong market, the
local firm increases its output from qU2L = 0.6103 to q
D
2L = 0.647, whereas
in the weak market the local firm reduces its output from qU1L = 0.3602 to
qD1L = 0.3235. All this leads to a 0.11% increase in welfare.
Now, if a1 = 2 then market 2 is the weak market. In this case, the local
firm increases its output in the strong market from qU1L = 1.22 to q
D
1L =
1.2921, whereas in the weak market, the local firm reduces its output from
qU2L = 0.7206 to q
D
2L = 0.647. As in the previous case, total output remains
constant, but welfare increases by 0.108%.
Finally, throughout this paper, we have assumed that the level of quality
of the global firm’s product is lower than those of the local firms. A natural
question arises on the welfare implications of the global firm’s product having
a higher quality level than those of the local firms. We show in the appendix
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that, for the case s1 = s2, the results are reversed relative to the case that
we consider in the paper.
The next corollary deals with the case of different quality levels in the
two markets.
Corollary 5 If s2 > s1, there is a threshold value of a1, such that for values
of a1 that do not exceed that threshold value, welfare increases while total
output decreases with price discrimination.
If s1 < s2 the level of quality of the product that the local firm sells in
market 2 exceeds that of the product sold by the local firm in market 1.
Unlike the case s1 = s2, and as seen in the previous section, total output is
not always constant. Hence, whether market 1 is the strong market depends
on the comparison between a1 and a
∗
1, where a
∗
1 does not equal a2, as it was
the case when s1 = s2. While there are some substitution effects involved in
both markets, since total output is not constant as in the case s1 = s2, the
welfare comparison is not as straightforward. Then we may come up with
four cases, which are listed as:
1. If a1 < w
∗ price discrimination decreases quantity, but welfare in-
creases.
2. If w∗ < a1 < pi∗, price discrimination decreases both quantity and
welfare.
3. If pi∗ < a1 < a∗1, the global firm is better off with a uniform price.
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4. If a∗1 < a1, price discrimination increases both quantity and welfare.
Figure 1 illustrates graphically these cases, by plotting the ∆W , ∆ΠG,
and ∆QG functions against a1. Recall that the functions are defined as the
differences between the cases of price discrimination and uniform price. This
means, for example, that whenever the ∆ΠG function is above the horizontal
axis, then the global firm’s profits increase with price discrimination. This
allows us to see for what values of a1 total welfare, total output, and the global
firm’s profits increase or decrease with price discrimination. In particular,
we can immediately verify that for values a1 < a
∗
1, output decreases and yet
welfare increases with price discrimination, while the global firm being better
off with price discrimination.
The ∆QG function is a linear function of a1. Recall that total output is
proportional to the global firm’s output, both under uniform price and under
price discrimination. Therefore, the sign of ∆QG is the same as the sign of
the change in total output. In the graph we see that when s1 < s2 total
output increases when the strong market is market 1, that is, when a1 > a
∗
1.
Furthermore, when that is the case, both the global firm’s profits and welfare
increase with price discrimination.
In contrast, when market 1 is the weak market (provided that s1 < s2)
then there is an interval of values of a1 such that the global firm’s profits de-
crease with price discrimination and another interval such that total welfare
decrease with price discrimination. These intervals are [pi∗, a∗1] and [w
∗, a∗1]
respectively. Hence, if a1 ∈ [pi∗, a∗1] then the global firm does not engage in
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price discrimination. However, if a1 ∈ [w∗, pi∗] then the global firm optimally
uses price discrimination, and welfare decreases. Finally, if a1 < w
∗ the
global firm price discriminates, total output decreases and welfare increases.
∆W ∆ΠG
a1
∆QG
a∗1pi
∗w∗
Figure 1: Output, profits, and welfare change as a function of a1
In order to assess how wide these intervals are, figure 2 plots the values
of a∗1, w
∗ and pi∗ as a function of s2, for s1 = 1.1. For every value of s2, if
a1 is greater than the maximum of a
∗
1, w
∗ and pi∗, then price discrimination
increases both output and welfare. If it is below the minimum of a∗1, w
∗ and
pi∗, output decreases, but welfare increases.
s2
a1
1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.8 1.9 2
0
1
2
3
4
5
w∗
pi∗
a∗1
Figure 2: a∗1, pi
∗ and w∗ as a function of s2, given that s1 = 1.1 and a2 = 1.
For instance, if s1 = 1 and s2 = 1.5 (with a2 = 1), then a
∗
1 = 3.4. Hence,
if a1 = 2, then market 1 is the weak market, since 2 < a
∗
1. In this case, total
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output decreases by 0.784%, although total welfare increases by 0.047%. In
the strong market, the local firm raises its output with price discrimination
from qU2L = 0.5682 to q
U
2L = 0.6, whereas in the weak market the local firm
decreases its output from qU1L = 1.3409 to q
D
1L = 1.2941. While total output
decreases, the fact that the local firm produces more in the strong market
makes welfare to increase.
In contrast, if a1 = 2.8 and the rest of the parameters remain constant,
welfare decreases and the global firm’s profits increase with price discrimina-
tion. Hence, in the case, the global firm has the incentive to introduce price
discrimination, this pricing policy being detrimental to welfare. If a1 = 3.1,
the global firm is better off setting a uniform price, which is better in terms
of welfare than price discrimination. Finally, if a1 = 4, then market 2 is now
the strong market and total output, welfare, and the global firm’s profits all
increase with price discrimination.
4 Concluding comments
This paper revisits the question of the welfare implications of third-degree
price discrimination, incorporating a vertical differentiation component. We
propose a theoretical model with two markets in which a firm that is present
in both markets, call it the global firm, competes against two firms active
in one of the markets only, call them the local firms. These are assumed
to offer a higher-quality product than the global firm. We find that there
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are parameter values such that, although price discrimination leads to a
decrease in total output, total welfare may increase. This is because the
positive allocation effect in the strong market more than offsets the negative
misallocation effect in the weak market.
We believe that our results have important policy implications. While we
do not argue that this inverse relationship between total output and welfare
must hold in all cases, our contribution tries to highlight the idea that the
competition authority can not take the basic result that an output expansion
is a necessary condition for welfare to increase with price discrimination
at face value. There are instances in which this result may fail to hold,
for instance when there are differences in quality and interactions among
markets, as we show in our paper.
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A The global firm’s product being of higher
quality
If the product sold by the global firm is of higher quality than those sold by
local firms then equations 1 y 2 become:
si(ai − xi)− pkiG = ai − xi − pkiL ⇔ xi = ai −
pkiG − pkiL
si − 1 . (21)
xiG = ai − p
k
iG − pkiL
si − 1 , xiL = ai − xi − p
k
iL. (22)
We now proceed to compute the market outcome, assuming that s1 =
s2 = s, in order to simplify the analysis. We will verify that the sign of the
welfare change is reversed relative to the case of the local firm’s products
being of superior quality.
A.1 Market outcome: Price discrimination
Given the expression for the demand functions, profits under price discrimi-
nation are:
ΠDL = p
D
1G
(
a1 − p
D
1G − pD1L
s− 1
)
+ pD2G
(
a2 − p
D
2G − pD2L
s− 1
)
; (23a)
ΠD1L = p
D
1L
(
pD1G − pD1L
s− 1 − p
D
1L
)
; ΠD2L = p
D
2L
(
pD2G − pD2L
s− 1 − p
D
2L
)
, (23b)
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and equilibrium prices are:
pD1G =
2a1s(s− 1)
4s− 1 , p
D
2G =
2a2s(s− 1)
4s− 1 (24a)
pD1L =
a1(s− 1)
4s− 1 , p
D
2L =
a2(s− 1)
4s− 1 . (24b)
Once the equilibrium prices have been obtained, output levels in equilib-
rium are:
qD1G =
2a1s
4s− 1 , q
D
2G =
2a2s
4s− 1 , q
D
1L =
a1s
4s− 1 , q
D
2L =
a2s
4s− 1 . (25)
A.2 Market outcome: Uniform price
As it was done in section 2.2.2, the global firm is constrained to posting a
uniform price, pUG, whereas local firms choose prices p
U
iL. Then, profits may
be written, as a function of these prices, as
ΠU1L = p
U
1L
(
pUG − pU1L
s− 1 − p
U
1L
)
; ΠU2L = p
U
2L
(
pUG − pU2L
s− 1 − p
U
2L
)
; (26a)
ΠUG = p
U
G
(
a1 − p
U
G − pU1L
s− 1
)
+ pUG
(
a2 − p
U
G − pU2L
s− 1
)
. (26b)
Solving the first-order conditions of these three maximization problems,
∂ΠU1L
∂pU1L
= 0,
∂ΠU2L
∂pU2L
= 0 and
∂ΠUG
∂pUG
= 0, the equilibrium prices chosen by the global
and the local firms are:
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pU1L = p
U
2L =
(a1 + a2)(s− 1)
2(4s− 1) (27a)
pUG =
(a1 + a2)s(s− 1)
4s− 1 . (27b)
These three equations, together with equation (22) allow us to compute
the equilibrium quantities. These are:
qU1L = q
U
2L =
s(a1 + a2)
2(4s− 1) , (28a)
qU1G =
2s(a1 + a2) + a1 − a2
2(4s− 1) , (28b)
qU2G =
2s(a1 + a2) + a2 − a1
2(4s− 1) . (28c)
A.3 Welfare
By comparing equations (25) and (28), it is easy to see that if s1 = s2 =
s, total output produced by the local firms and by the global firm is the
same under both regimes. Regarding welfare, this is given by the following
expressions:
WD =
(a21 + a
2
2)s(12s
2 − s− 2)
2(4s− 1)2
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and
WU =
(a21 + a
2
2)s(28s
2 − 9s− 1)− 2a1a2(s− 1)s(4s− 3)
4(4s− 1)2
Computing the difference between the two welfare levels, we see that when-
ever a1 6= a2, welfare will be higher under a uniform price:
WD −WU = −(a1 − a2)
2(s− 1)s(4s− 3)
4(4s− 1)2 < 0
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